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In order to explain multiple growth regimes, one of the working hypotheses is based on 
initial conditions.  Using a standard optimal growth with the status effect represented by  
wealth  a la Friedman (1953), this paper obtains multiple growth regimes based on initial 
conditions without reliance on other assumptions such as nonlinearities of production or 
consumption functions and heterogeneous agents/savings behavior.  With the status effect, the 
resulting equilibrium distribution is characterized by a group with a lower level of income and 
another group with a higher level of income.  Globally, a sufficiently strong monetary policy 
may be an instrument in order for an economy in poverty traps to take off and become wealthy in 
the long run.  Locally, our model sheds light on the relationship between money/inflation and 
capital in the long run that, given general cash-in-advance constraints on investment relative to 
consumption, is determined by the curvature of the utilities of wealth and consumption. 
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1 Introduction 
The notion that an individual might care about wealth has a long history and traditionally 
viewed possession of wealth as a standard of success and a measure of status in a society.  An 
early exposition of such ideas of status effect was Veblen (1899), but a formal account of wealth 
was not offered until Friedman (1953) who analyzed individuals’ choice and found the resulting 
distribution effect with a group having a lower level of wealth while the other group having a 
higher level of wealth.  Although Kurz (1968) has formally incorporated the wealth effect in a 
neoclassical growth model, the implications of the effect of wealth have been neglected neglected 
in a general-equilibrium framework.  Recently, Robson (1992) extended the Friedman model 
and compared the models with and without the relative standing of wealth in a society.       
With the status effect, when the utility of wealth is increasing and concave, as proposed by 
Friedman (1953) and proved by Robson (1992), there are possibly multiple levels of capital in a 
steady state.  Thus, otherwise identical countries except different levels of initial capital per 
capita converge to different long-run growth regimes.  There were existing studies of multiple 
growth regimes whose working hypothesis was based on initial history, but they also relied on 
other assumptions.
1  For example, Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Galor and Weil (2000) 
assumed nonlinearities of production or consumption functions at different levels/stages of capital, 
and Galor (1996) assumed heterogeneous agents/savings behavior.  One attractive feature of a 
standard optimal growth model with the status effect is that multiple growth regimes can arise 
naturally without relying on nonlinearities of production, heterogeneity of agents or other 
assumptions.  
The purpose of this paper is to study a monetary version of an optimal growth model with 
the status effect.  Our global analysis envisages the role of monetary policy that leads to a big 
push from poverty traps or causes a big crash in rich clubs.  To the best of our knowledge, a 
global long-run effect of monetary supply on capital has never been analyzed.
2  Our local 
analysis will shed light on the role of the curvature of utility on the relationship between 
money/inflation and capital in the long run, an old but ongoing debate made popular by Tobin 
(1965), Sidrauski (1967), Lucas (1980) and Stockman (1981). 
                                                 
1  There are two other different working hypotheses in establishing multiple growth regimes.  (i) 
Countries are inherently different in one or more fundamental aggregate features (e.g., Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992).  (ii) Fundamentally identical countries have different 
expectations (Matsuyama, 1991; Chen and Shimomura, 1998).    See survey in Azariadis (1996).   
 
2 Monetary policy has been found effective in a liquidity trap.  In a dynamic general-equilibrium 
model with a liquidity trap, Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) found that large-scale open market purchases of 
domestic government bonds can achieve a substantial welfare improvement. 
    2
The status effect has recently received interest in the investigation of various economic 
issues.  Within the context of real models, the issues under study include relative wealth as a 
social norm effect (Cole, et al., 1992; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997), endogenous growth (Zou, 1994; 
Futagami and Shibata, 1998), and stock market prices (Bakshi and Chen, 1996).  More recently, 
Gong and Zou (2001) and Chang and Tsai (2003) extended the status effect into a monetary 
economy via a cash-in-advance (henceforth, CIA) constraint and re-examined the long-run 
relationship between monetary growth and capital.  Gong and Zou (2001) and Chang and Tsai 
(2003) obtained one steady state and their long-run relationships between money and capital were 
solely dictated by the CIA constraint on investment relative to consumption.
3 
In this paper we study an optimal growth model with the status effect and with two more 
extensions.    First, as firms hold more cash and consumers use more credit than what one used to 
assume,
4 we consider the most general CIA constraint on investment relative to that on 
consumption with their relative degree smaller or larger than unity.
5  Yet, as we will see, even 
the most general CIA constraint alone cannot dictate the long-run local relationship between 
money and capital.  Second, the wealth is the sum of capital and a fraction of real balances.  
Under a CIA constraint, money is not used based on the store-of-value motives; an individual 
holds cash for transaction purposes.  Thus, an agent may not perceive real balances completely 
as wealth, at least for the portion held for purchase of consumption.  We capture such a feature 
by considering a fraction of real balances as wealth.    As will be seen, the degree of real balances 
perceived as wealth affects capital in a way depending on relative risk aversion in wealth.   
Our main findings are summarized as follows.  First, there are multiple locally stable 
steady states.  Thus, otherwise identical economies except for different initial levels of capital 
end up in different convergence clubs.  Locally, a monetary policy cannot generate an effect to 
elude poverty traps.  Globally, a sufficiently strong monetary policy may be an instrument in 
                                                 
3 While Gong and Zou (2001) uncovered a negative relationship when the CIA constraint on 
investment relative to consumption was one, Chang and Tsai (2003) found a positive relationship when the 
CIA constraint on investment relative to consumption was sufficiently smaller than one.  Neither the 
curvature of the utility from holding wealth nor that of consumption plays any role.  As our findings 
below indicate, the results in Gong and Zou (2001) and Chang and Tsai (2003) are special cases.   
   
4  Bates, et al, (2006) documented that firms held much more cash after 1980 with the average ratio of 
cash to total assets more than doubled in the past 20 years.  Moreover, Ludvigson (1999) uncovered that 
as a fraction of personal income, consumer credit had doubled during the postwar period, with particularly 
sharp and sustained increases occurring in the past 20 years. 
  
5 Existing models assumed the CIA constraint on investment relative to the constraint on 
consumption is either equal to unity (Stockman, 1981; Gong and Zou, 2001) or smaller than unity (Wang 
and Yip, 1992; Chang and Tsai, 2003.  Like ours, Chen and Guo (2007) considered a general CIA 
constraint, albeit in the analysis of local indeterminacy and in an endogenous growth framework.       
     3
order for an economy in a poverty trap to take off and becomes wealthy in the long run.  
Alternatively, however, a strong monetary policy in an opposite direction may also lead a wealthy 
economy to a big crash.    Existing studies paid no attention to this role of monetary policy.   
Second, in our local analysis, the long-run relationship between money/inflation and capital 
depends on the curvature of the utility of wealth relative to consumption as compared with a 
threshold that is affected by the CIA constraint on investment relative to consumption.    Given a 
general relative CIA constraint, the curvature of the utility in wealth vis-à-vis consumption 
governs the local relationship between money and growth.    Existing studies paid attention to the 
relative CIA constraint, but not to the role of the relative curvature of utility.   
Finally, a higher degree of real balances perceived as wealth exerts a local effect on capital 
depending on the relative risk aversion in wealth as compared to a threshold that is affected by the 
growth rate of money and the relative CIA constraint.    Given the threshold, in an economy with 
larger curvature in the utility of wealth, a higher degree of real balances perceived as wealth has a 
negative long-run effect on capital.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.    Section 2 sets up a model and studies 
the optimization and the equilibrium.  Section 3 characterizes the steady-state equilibrium in a 
local and a global analysis.    Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in Section 4.   
 
2 The  Model 
The basic model is based on Friedman (1953), Kurz (1968) and Stockman (1981).  The 
economy consists of a continuum of identical agents, each supplying labor inelastically.  The 
lifetime utility of the representative agent is     
0
[ ( ) ( )] ,
t Uu c v w e d t
ρ β
∞ − =+ ∫   
where c is consumption per capita, w is an agent’s perceived wealth per capita, ρ>0 is the time 
preference rate and β≥0 is the degree of wealth on the preference relative to consumption. 
  Wealth and preference are connected through many reasons.  First, a wealthy agent can 
afford a house in an expensive, good district like Beverly Hill in Los Angels.  Moreover, in a 
capital market with imperfect information, an agent with access to wealth is easier to obtain loans 
because of collateral (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983) and is easier to become an entrepreneur who 
monitors workers (Banerjee and Newman, 1993).  Finally, in political economy, wealth can be 
used to buy either a power in politics or an ownership power in a firm through share holdings 
(Bowles  and  Gintis,  1992).       
We assume a separable form for the consumption-induced utility and the wealth-induced   4
utility so there is no direct substitution effect on utility between consumption and wealth.
6  T h e  
same form was used in Kurz (1968), Gong and Zou (2001), and Chang and Tsai (2003). 
In our model, the agent’s perceived level of wealth is   
w=k+γm,                                  ( 1 )  
which includes his capital, k, and a part of his real balances, m.  Parameter 0≤γ≤1 is the degree 
of real balances perceived by an agent as wealth.  In our model, an individual chooses to hold 
real balances only for transactions and not for a store of value.    Thus, the agent may not perceive 
real balances completely as wealth, at least for the portion held in order to purchase consumption.   
It is reasonable to capture such a feature by assuming a degree of real balances perceived as 
wealth.  Two extreme cases are in order.  If γ=0, real balance is not recognized as wealth, as 
were in Kurz (1968) and Zou (1994).    Alternatively, if γ=1, all real balance is accepted as wealth, 
as were in Gong and Zou (2001) and Chang and Tsai (2003). 
Felicity u  has a standard strictly increasing and concave property; i.e., u׳(c)>0>u״(c).  
Moreover, felicity v is strictly increasing and strictly concave; i.e., v׳(w)>0>v״(w).  A concave 
utility of wealth is reasonable according to Robson (1992) who showed that the attitudes to risk in 
a strictly increasing and concave utility provide a natural explanation of the fundamental 
phenomenon addressed by Friedman and Savage (1948) that individuals may simultaneously 
purchase insurance and participate in lotteries.             
Let f(k) be an individual’s output and thus income per capita, with f(k) strictly increasing 
and strictly concave in capital per capita; i.e., f´(k)>0>f″(k).  The representative agent’s budget 
constraint is 
() , kmf k c m kT πδ += − − − +                           ( 2 )  
where π is the inflation rate, δ is the depreciation rate of capital and T is real transfer per capita 
from the government.  The budget constraint states that income and transfers not spent on 
consumption are used either to form capital or to hold real balances.    Initial capital and nominal 
money are predetermined.    Assume that money grows at a constant rate μ.  
Denote I the gross investment per capita.  The gross investment net of the depreciation 
then forms new capital in the way as follows.   
. kI k δ =−                                 ( 3 )  
The representative agent faces the following CIA constraint 
,0 1 ,  0 1 . cI c I cI m ϕ ϕϕ ϕ + ≤≤ ≤ ≤ ≤                     ( 4 )  
                                                 
6  As money enters the utility, eliminating the substitutability between consumption and real balances 
is in favor of the super-neutrality of money, according to Asako (1983). 
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The CIA constraint includes several special cases.  (i) If φc=1 and φI=0, only consumption 
is liquidity constrained as assumed in Clower (1967) and Lucas (1980).    (ii) If φc=φI=1, the CIA 
constraint on investment relative to consumption is one as employed in Stockman (1981) and 
Abel (1985).  (iii) If φc=1 and 0<φI≤1, the CIA constraint on investment is smaller than that on 
consumption as utilized in Wang and Yip (1992) and Palivos et al (1993).     
It is clear that (4) is general in that it includes not only all existing cases but also the case 
where the CIA constraint on investment relative to consumption is larger than one.  Evidence 
indicates that firms in the U.S. held much more cash after 1980 with the average ratio of cash to 
total assets more than doubled in the past 20 years (cf. Bates, et al, 2006).  The motives of 
holding so much cash include transaction motives (Mulligan, 1997), precautionary motives (Opler, 
et al, 1999), agency motives (Jensen, 1986) and/or tax motives (Hartzell et al, 2006).  Together 
with the fact that consumer credit had a sharp increase in the past 20 years (Ludvigson, 1999) it is 
therefore plausible that the degree of CIA constraints on investment is higher than that on 
consumption, at least during some periods of time. 
 
2.1 Optimization 
The representative agent’s optimization problem is to maximize the lifetime utility by 
choosing between consumption, investment and real balances, all of which are subject to the 
constraints in (2)-(4).  Let λk>0 and λm>0 be the co-state variables associated with capital and 
real balances, respectively, and ξ>0 be  the Lagrange multiplier of the CIA constraint.  The 
necessary conditions are 
                       () , mc uc λ ξϕ ′ = +                              ( 5 a )  
, km I λ λξ ϕ = +                               ( 5 b )  
() ( )( ) , kk m f kv w λρ δ λ λ β ′′ =+ − −                       ( 5 c )  
() ' ( ) , mm vw λ ρπ λ β γξ = +− −                         ( 5 d )  
















= .   
In these conditions, (5a) equalizes the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal cost 
of consumption, the sum of the shadow price of real balances and the shadow price of the CIA 
constraint on consumption.  Next, in (5b) optimal investment requires no arbitrage between 
capital and real balances.    Thus, the shadow price of capital must equal the shadow price of real 
balances and the shadow price of the CIA constraint on investment.    Finally, conditions (5c) and 
(5d) are the intertemporal no-arbitrage conditions which govern how each of the two Hamiltonian 
shadow prices changes over time.     6
  
2.2 Equilibrium   
In equilibrium, government real transfers are financed by the increase in monetary supply; 
thus, T=μm.    The money and the goods markets are both clear; i.e.,     
() , mm μ π = −                                ( 6 a )  
() kf kc k δ =− −  .                             ( 6 b )  
A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a time path {c, m, k, λk, λm, ξ, π}.  The path satisfies the 
agent’s optimization, (5a)-(5d), the money and the goods market equilibrium, (6a)-(6b), and the 
binding CIA constraint (4).
7    Below, we explain how the equilibrium is determined.      
First, if we substitute ξ in (5b) into (5a), we obtain 
() ( 1 ) (, ) .
II
cc km k m uc c
ϕϕ
ϕϕ λ λλλ ′ =+ − ≡                      ( 7 a )  
Next, differentiating (5a) with respect to time, with the use of (5c) and (7a), yields 
1
() [( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( 1 ) ] ,
c I
I c mk m m uc cf k w c
ϕ ϕ
ϕϕ λ βν ρ δ λ λ λ −
′′ ′′ =+ − + − −          ( 7 b )  
which is the Keynes-Ramsey condition.   
Moreover, as (3) and (6b) indicate f(k)=c+I, the CIA constraint suggests m=(φc−φI)c+φI f(k).  
If we differentiate this relationship and use (6a), we attain 
(/ 1 ) ( )









   
By substituting  c    in (7b) and  k    in (6b), along with  k λ    in (5c) and m λ  in (5d), the above 
expression leads to the following relationship 
(,, ) . m ck π πλ =                               ( 7 c )  
Finally, substituting ξ in (5b) into (5d), together with (7a) and (7c), yields   
        




mm m ck v w
λλ
ϕϕ λλ ρ π λ β γ =+ + − −                ( 7 d )  
Thus, the equilibrium system is simplified to three equations, (6b), (7b) and (7d).  These 
equations determine the equilibrium paths of c, k and λm.  The  equilibrium  paths  of  λk, ξ, π and m 
are in turn determined by (7a), (5b), (7c) and (4).     
 
2.3 Steady  State   
In a steady state,  0. m ck m λ == = =     Under  0, m =   then (6a) gives inflation as π
*=μ.
8  
                                                 
7 Following Lucas (1980) and Wang and Yip (1992), we assume the CIA constraint is binding in 
equilibrium. 
 
8  An asterisk is used to denote values in a steady state.   7
First, under  0, k =   (6b)  is  
** * () 0 , fk k c δ − −=                             ( 8 a )  
which is the long-run goods market equilibrium condition.   
Next, if we substitute the expression in (7a),  0 c =    in (7b) becomes 
** * * * {( )[1 ( )] ( )} ( , ) '( ( , ))[1 ( )], Im I fk ck vw ck ρ δϕ ρ μ λ β γ ϕ ρ δ ′ ++ + − = + +      ( 8 b )  
in which, with the use of (4) and (7d) under  0, m λ = 
 w(c, k) and λm(c, k) are 
** * * * * * (,) [ ] , cI wc k k m k c k γγ ϕ ϕ δ ≡+ =+ +                      ( 9 a )  
* (' () ( ) ) ** * 1





γϕ ρ δ λϕ
++ − + −
++ ′ ≡+                    ( 9 b )  
As v׳>0 and λm>0, consistency in (8b) requires 
* ( ) ( )[1 ( )]. I fk ρ δϕ ρ μ ′ <+ + +  
which is a variant of the Brock-Gale condition that requires the marginal product of capital to be 
dominated by the sum of the time-preference and the discount rates in a steady state. 
Equations (8a) and (8b) simultaneously determine the values of k
* and c
* in a steady state.  
In a (k, c) plane, it is easy to show that the  0 k =    locus is positively slopping for all k such that 
f´(k)>δ and negatively slopping for all k such that f´(k)<δ.   
For the shape of the  0 c =   locus, there are three cases in terms of the degree of wealth on 
the preference relative to consumption. 
 
Case 1.    β=0. 
In this case, there is no status effect.    Now,  0 c =   becomes  
* () ( ) () () 0 . I fk ρδ ϕρδρμ ′ +− + + +=                     ( 1 0 a )  
Then, the  0 c =   locus is a vertical line in the (k, c) plane.  Obviously, there is a unique 
steady  state.  See  E3 in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Case 2.    β>0 and γ=0.  




() ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [1 ( )].
vk
Ic uc fk
β ρ δϕ ρ δ ρ μ ϕ ρ μ
′ ′ +− + + += + +             ( 1 0 b )  
It is easy to show the lefthand side of (10b) is increasing in k, while the righthand side of 
(10b) is decreasing in k and increasing in c.  Thus,  the  0 c =    locus is positively slopping in the 
(k, c) plane.  As a result, there may be multiple steady states, as illustrated by E1, E2 and E3 in 
Figure 1   8
 
Case 3.    β>0 and γ>0.  




'( ( )) *
() () ( ) () () ,
cI vk c k
I uc fk
βγ ϕ ϕ δ ρδ ϕρδρμ
++
′ ′ +− + + += Λ              ( 1 0 c )  
where 
* 1 ( ) [ '( ) ( )( )] 0. cc I c fk ϕρ μ γ ϕ ϕ ϕ ρδ Λ≡ + + + + − + >  
It is easy to see that  0 c =   is positively slopping in the (k, c) plane, like the case in (10b).  
Thus, there may be multiple steady states, as illustrated by E1, E2 and E3 in Figure 1. 
For the three steady states in Figure 1, E2 is a source, while E1 and E3 are saddles and are 
thus locally stable.  See an appendix for proof.  If the initial level of capital is above k2, the 
economy will converge to E3 in a steady state.  The economy becomes a wealthy economy.  
Alternatively, if the initial level of capital is below k2, the economy will converge toward E1 in a 
steady state, and thus a development trap.    There are thus multiple growth regimes and the initial 
history determines its eventual fate.  Otherwise identical economies become poor or wealthy in 
the long run depending on the initial conditions.  There is a set of countries in poverty traps 
along with another set of countries in rich clubs. 
In our model multiple growth regimes naturally arise in a standard optimal growth model 
with the status effect.    Existing working hypotheses in establishing multiple growth regimes may 
be broadly classified into three types, according to Azariadis (1996).    These are (i) differences in 
initial conditions (e.g., Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Galor and Weil, 2000), (ii) differences in one 
or more fundamental aggregate features (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Mankiw et al., 
1992), and (iii) differences in expectations (Matsuyama, 1991; Chen and Shimomura, 1998).   
Our working hypothesis follows the line of thought (i).  In our paper, a standard growth model 
with a concave status effect naturally leads to multiple growth regimes without relying on other 
assumptions made in existing studies.  Among the additional assumptions, external effects in 
technologies were made in some studies (e.g., Krugman, 1987; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990), 
while heterogeneous agents/savings behavior were assumed in others (e.g., Galor and Ryder, 
1989; Galor, 1992, 1996).    Some other works assumed imperfect capital market (e.g., Galor and 
Zeira, 1993; Benabou, 1996), imperfect financial intermediations (Cooper and Ejarque, 1995; 
Becsi, et al., 1999), and binding subsistence consumption constraint at a low initial level of 
capital (e.g., Galor and Weil, 2000).  Except for Shimomura (2004) and Chen (2007),
9 existing 
                                                 
9 In a two-good, two-country trade model without capital, Shimomura (2004) obtained multiple 
steady states based on a negative income effect of the durable good in a range of the shadow price.    Chen 
(2007) obtained two steady states based on habit accumulation in a one-sector model, but it is in an 
endogenous growth framework.     9
studies incorporate some forms of market imperfections or heterogeneities, which generate 
multiple steady states. There is no market imperfection or heterogeneity in our model, yet the 
resulting equilibrium capital/wealth distribution may be Pareto inefficient. 
The mechanism for multiple growth regimes here is the internal status effect in a concave 
utility with the risk attitudes about wealth that is consistent with the phenomenon of simultaneous 
purchases of insurance and lotteries described by Friedman and Savage (1948).  Intuitively, the 
representative agent obtains utility form holding wealth in a concave fashion in a similar way to 
what consumption gives utility.  On optimality in the Keynes-Ramsey condition, a higher level 
of consumption comes with a higher level of wealth.  If an agent chooses to accumulate more 
capital, the marginal utility of wealth is diminishing.  This increases the growth rate of the 
shadow prices of both capital and real balances in terms of consumption (cf. (5c) and (5d)).    The 
representative agent needs to increase the level of consumption so the shadow prices of both 
capital and real balances in terms of consumption decrease to a constant in a steady state (cf. (5a) 
and (5b)).    As a result, when an agent optimally chooses to hold more capital, he will choose to 
consume more. 
With the emergence of a poverty trap like E1 in Figure 1, it is interesting to investigate 
policies in order to help the economy out of the trap and take off.  Although monetary policies 
have been found to be effective in a liquidity trap in Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005), attention has 
never been paid to their role as a mechanism for a takeoff from a development trap.  We 
investigate such a possibility in the next section. 
 
3.  Characterization of Equilibrium 
Suppose that the steady-state equilibrium is at E1 in Figure 1.  Implicitly we assume that 
the initially endowed capital per capita is below the level of k2 in Figure 1.  As a result, the 
economy ends up in a poverty trap at E1.    We analyze the effects of monetary growth on capital 
accumulation in the long run.    We start by a local analysis, followed by a global analysis. 
 
3.1 Local  Analysis 
When the monetary growth rate is increased (i.e., a higher μ) and thus inflation is increased, 
the 0 k =    locus is not affected.    However, holding c constant, the  0 c =    locus is shifted in the 
direction of k direction of k as follows. 
' ' 1
0












≥≥                        ( 1 1 )  
where 
' (1 ) (1 ){1 ( ) [ '( ) ( )( )]} 0.
vv
cI c c I c uu ff f k
ββ γϕ γϕ ϕ ρ μ γ ϕ ϕ ϕ ρ δ
′′
′′ ′′ ′ Ω≡ + + + + + + + − + <    10
Obviously, the  0 c =   locus may shift leftward or rightward.  If the  0 c =   locus shifts 
leftward, capital decreases in the long run (see E1
׳ in Figure 2).  Alternatively, if the  0 c =   
locus shifts rightward, capital increases in the long run (see E1
״  in Figure 2).     
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Whether the  0 c =   locus shifts leftward or rightward depends on the ratio of the marginal 
utility of wealth to the marginal utility of consumption,  ', v
u′  as compared to a threshold,  ˆ. ξ   
Thus, given the threshold, the curvature of the utility induced by wealth relative to the curvature 
of the utility generated by consumption is crucial in the determination of the long-run effect of 
monetary supply on capital.     
In the situation where the marginal utility of wealth is sufficiently large relative to the 
marginal utility of consumption, a higher monetary growth rate leads the agent to substitute away 
from consumption toward investment.  As a result, the level of capital is larger in the long run.  
Intuitively, when the marginal utility of wealth is sufficiently large relative to the marginal utility 
of consumption, in response to higher monetary growth rates and thus lower real balances the 
representative agent will reduce consumption and increase investment in order to decrease the 
marginal utility of wealth.  Alternatively, under the condition where the marginal utility of 
wealth is sufficiently small relative to the marginal utility of consumption, the agent increases 
consumption and reduces investment in response to a higher growth rate of monetary supply.  
Thus, capital is reduced in the long run.     
In characterizing the threshold, it is decreasing in the degree of wealth on the preference 
relative to consumption and increasing in the liquidity constrains on investment relative to 
consumption.  For a given positive degree of wealth on the preference relative to consumption 
(i.e., β>0), a higher CIA constraint on investment relative to consumption (i.e., higher φI/φc) 
increases the threshold and thus reduces the likelihood of a positive effect of money on capital 
accumulation.  A lower CIA constraint on investment relative to consumption (i.e., lower φI/φc) 
decreases the threshold, and thus increases the likelihood of a positive effect of money on capital 
accumulation.    There are some special cases. 
1  φc =1, φI=0: (Lucas, 1980) then (11) becomes -βv′/(Ωu′)≥0 if v′≥0.  
2  φc=1, φI=1: (Stockman, 1981) then (11) becomes (ρ+δ-βv′/u′)/Ω≤(≥)0 if v′≤0(v′/u′≥(ρ+δ)/β).   
3  φc=1, φI<1: (Wang and Yip, 1992) then (11) becomes [φI(ρ+δ)-βv′/u′]/Ω≤(≥)0 if v′≤0(v′/u′≥ 
[φI(ρ+δ)/β]). 
4  φc =0, φI=1:  then  (11)  becomes  φI(ρ+δ)/Ω<0. 
Only when consumption is not cash constrained such that φI/φc approaches infinity, there is 
no role for the status effect and the long-run relationship between money and capital is   11
ambiguously negative.  With the status effects, our results suggest neither the outcome of a 
neutral relationship between monetary growth and capital when φI/φc is 0, as conceived by Lucas 
(1980), nor the outcome of a positive relationship between monetary growth and capital when 
φI/φc is very small and close to 0, as posited by Gong and Zou (2001), nor the conclusion of a 
negative relationship between monetary growth and capital when φI/φc is 1 or close to 1, as put 
forward by Stockman (1981), Wang and Yip (1992) and Chang and Tsai (2001).  The curvature 
of utilities between wealth and consumption needs to be taken into account in the determination 
of the long-run relationship between money and capital when there is a status effect.   
Given a threshold, the relationship between the long-run effect of monetary growth on 
capital and the ratio of the marginal utility of wealth to the marginal utility of consumption is thus 
positive (Figure 3).    The relationship shifts upward if β is higher and downward if φI/φc is larger. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
The above results seemingly indicate that the degree of real balances perceived as wealth 
has no effects on capital accumulation in the long run.  As we will see below, the degree to 
which real balances are perceived as wealth does affect capital accumulation in the long run.         
Specifically, when the degree of real balances perceived as wealth increases, the  0 k =   
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The above expression asserts that in response to a larger degree of real balances perceived 
as wealth, the  0 c =   locus may shift leftward so capital decreases or shift rightward so capital 
increases in the long run.   The direction of such shifts depends on the coefficient of the relative 
risk aversion in the utility of wealth, ε, as compared to a threshold,  ˆ. ε     Here, and different from 
the effects of monetary growth, the curvature in the utility of consumption produces no effects.  
Only the attitude to risk, or the curvature in the utility of wealth, is relevant to the effect.  
Specifically, when the relative risk aversion in the utility of wealth is larger than the threshold, 
there is a strong diminishing marginal utility of wealth.  In this situation, when there is a larger 
degree of real balances perceived as wealth, real balances can substitute for capital, thereby 
leading to lower capital holdings.  Alternatively, if the relative risk aversion in the 
wealth-induced utility is smaller than the threshold, the agent accumulates more capital. 
Characterizing the threshold, it is straightforward to show that the threshold decreases in 
both the growth rate of monetary supply and the ratio of real balances to capital and increases in   12
the ratio of CIA constraint on investment relative to consumption.    Thus, given the coefficient of 
risk aversion in wealth, a smaller growth rate of monetary supply, a smaller ratio of real balances 
to capital, and a larger ratio of CIA constraint on investment relative to consumption reduce the 
likelihood that a larger degree of real balances perceived as wealth exerts a negative effect on 
capital accumulation in the long run. 
For a given threshold, the relationship between the effect of the degree of real balances 
perceived as wealth on capital accumulation in the long run and the coefficient of risk aversion in 
wealth-induced utility is thus negative.    See an illustration of the relationship in Figure 4.   The 
relationship shifts downward if u and m/k are higher and upward if φI/φc is higher. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
3.2 Global  Analysis 
In the former subsection, the effect of a monetary policy is local.    As a result, starting from 
a poverty trap and with a monetary policy, the economy remains in the trap.  However, a 
monetary policy could boost a global effect as analyzed below.     
Suppose that in the neighborhood of a poverty trap (E1 in Figure 5), the marginal utility of 
wealth relative to the marginal utility of consumption is larger than threshold  ˆ. ξ   Now,  suppose 
that the monetary growth rate is increased.    If the growth rate of money is increased sufficiently 
strong the  0 c =   locus may shift rightward so much so that the only steady state is at E3
'.  The 
economy eventually joins the rich-country club.  Intuitively, because of high inflation, real 
balances are reduced sufficiently and are substituted away from consumption and toward capital 
sufficiently.  The equilibrium then moves gradually from E1 and eventually toward E3
'.  The 
economy under study therefore takes off from a poverty trap and becomes prosperous.     
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
Alternatively, suppose that the marginal utility of wealth relative to the marginal utility of 
consumption is smaller than threshold  ˆ. ξ   Now, the marginal utility of wealth is relatively 
smaller than the marginal utility of consumption.  Thus, if the growth rate of money is reduced 
sufficiently, the  0 c =   locus may shift rightward.  Then, the only steady state is E3
'.  As a 
result, the level of capital increases from initial k1 toward k3
’.   
Similar takeoff results may be obtained in combination with changes in the degree of real 
balances perceived as wealth.  For example, suppose that the attitude to risk in the utility of 
wealth is larger than the threshold  ˆ ε  (like F in Figure 4).  Then, if the degree of real balances 
perceived by the representative agent is decreased sufficiently, the equilibrium may move from E1   13
gradually toward E3
' (Figure 5).  This situation often emerges in an economy where credit 
markets are imperfect and new currencies are issued to stop hyperinflation.
10 
To illustrate, successful takeoffs have been made in several East Asian economies where the 
“four tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, S. Korea and Taiwan) have joined the rich-country club and 
now so too with China.  One example was the experiences of Taiwan during 1945-1952 when 
Taiwan was poverty stricken.  During this period the monetary supply was used as the 
inflationary taxes with over 70% of the revenue remitted to the government or its enterprises.  
As a result, the monthly inflation rate of whole sale prices was over 16.5%, or equivalently over 
500% per annum.
11  Several actions were taken in order to stabilize the economy at the end of 
1949.  In particular, the old currency was replaced by a new currency and the growth of 
monetary supply was strictly controlled.    Thus, if the curvature of utility in the Taiwan economy 
is akin to point B in Figure 3 and point D in Figure 4, then by tightening the monetary growth rate 
sufficiently the locus  0 c =   shifts rightward.  Moreover, by issuing new currencies, people are 
more willing to hold currency, and the degree to which real balances are perceived as wealth is 
higher.    As a result of these policies, people in Taiwan held currency for longer periods and were 
more willing to deposit their money in banks.
12  In the decades that followed, the Taiwan 
economy stabilized, grew rapidly by the 1960s and became industrialized in the 2000s. 
On the contrary, expansionary monetary policy has driven an initially rich country to a big 
crash as experienced in some Latin American countries in the post-WWII era.   This outcome is 
especially obvious in Argentine which experienced an unprecedented boom since the turn of the 
twentieth century but was persistently retardated after WWII.
13  Along with other policies, 
Argentina had a high growth rate of money supply that led to high inflation for long periods.  
The annual inflation rate was 30.3% in 1950-59, 23.3% in 1960-69, 132.3% in 1970-79 and 
                                                 
10  The effect of inflation/deflation on the big push is more credible in economies with imperfect 
credit markets.    This justifies the wealth-status effect as some forms of wealth are good 
collateral when a household or firm wants to borrow.    Our examples illustrated below are about 
some developing economies whose credit markets were imperfect.       
 
11  See Tsiang (1980) and Makinen and Woodward (1989) for accounts of hyperinflation in Taiwan.    Korea 
had a similar experience during 1945-48, with an average monthly inflation rate over 11.1%, or 
equivalently over 250% per annum.  See Campbell and Tullock (1957) and Kim and Kim (1996) for 
accounts of South Korean hyperinflation.     
  
12 These were accompanied by the policy of a “Preferential Interest Rate” (at 7% per month or 125% per 
annum) established for time deposits and the outward-looking,  export-expansion  policy.   
  
13  According to Taylor (1994, Table 1), Argentina used to have more than 75% of average GDP per capita 
of 28 OECD countries before WWII, but declined to 65% by 1950 and further to 32% by 1987.   
   14
750.4% in 1980-89.
14  Such high rates of inflation lead the economy originally at equilibrium 
with high income at E3 to move to E1
׳ (in Figure 5).  An irreversible downturn, and even a big 
crash, thus emerges.    Capital is de-accumulated and the economy is in poverty traps.   
 
3.3  A Numerical Example 
We now offer a numerical example to illustrate our results.  We take u(c)=[c
(1-σ) -1]/(1-σ) 
and  v(w)=w
θ/θ.  The utility has a constant intertemporal elasticity of consumption that is 
consistent with economic growth.    The technology takes the Cobb-Douglas form, f(k)=Ak
η.  
We set ρ=0.04, σ=1.5, θ=1, β=0.7, A=0.3, η=0.4, δ=0.065, φc=φI=1, γ=0.1, and μ=5.  Under 
this set of parameter values, there are three steady states:   k1=0.1027, k2=1.3955 and k3=3.7099.  
Moreover, k1 and k3 are locally stable and k2 is a source.    If the central bank increases the growth 
rate of money to μ=6, the two saddle points corresponding to k1 and k3 are decreased locally.  
Alternatively, if the growth rate of money is decreased to μ=4, capital per capita is increased 
locally.
15    See Table 1.    In Table 1, we also quantify the effects of changes in other parameters. 
  Now, suppose that the government changes monetary supply sufficiently strong by reducing 
the growth rate of money from μ=5 to μ=1.
16    Then, there is only one steady state with k3=5.2348.  
If the growth rate of money is tightened to μ=.2, then capital is increased further to k3=6.1714.   
Sufficiently tight monetary policy thus causes a big push.     
  Alternatively, suppose that the central bank changes the growth rate of monetary supply 
sufficiently by increasing the growth rate of money from μ=5 to μ=10.
17  In this case, there is 
only a steady state with k1=0.0286.  If the economy is originally at k3, then loosening money 
supply too much brings about a big crash.     
  
4 Concluding  Remarks 
In order to explain why many countries are in poverty traps and there are multiple growth 
regimes, several working hypotheses are proposed in the literature.  Among these is the one 
                                                 
14 These numbers are taken from Cavallo (1996), a former minister of Economy and Public Works, 
Republic of Argentina.  The monetary policy came with the inward-looking, import-substitution policy 
and nationalist government before 1970 and the external debt policy in 1979-1982.    See detailed accounts 
in Diaz-Alejandro (1984) for Latin American debt.     
 
15  Capital per capita increases to k2=1.630911 under μ=6 and decreases to k2=1.0955847 under μ=4. Yet, k2 
is unstable and thus the equilibrium will diverge from it.  
   
16  The threshold is μ=3.04, at and below which there is only a steady state.     
 
17  The threshold is μ=9.58, at and above which there is only a steady state.   
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based upon initial conditions.  Existing studies whose working hypotheses are initial conditions 
also rely on other assumptions such as nonlinearities of production or consumption functions at 
different levels/stages of capital and heterogeneous agents/savings behavior.  Using a standard 
optimal growth, this paper obtains insights on multiple growth regimes based on initial conditions 
without dependence on these additional assumptions.     
Our model departs by considering the status effect represented by wealth.    The status effect 
has been used to analyze individuals’ choice and dates back to Friedman (1953).    With the status 
effect, the resulting equilibrium distribution is characterized by a group with a lower level of 
income and another group with a higher level of income.  Thus, otherwise identical economies 
end up in different convergence clubs if the initial levels of capital are different. 
We characterize monetary policies as an instrument for a takeoff.  Locally, monetary 
policies only have a small effect and countries in poverty traps remain poor.  Globally, a 
sufficiently strong monetary policy may be used as an instrument in order for an economy in 
poverty traps to take off and becomes wealthy in the long run.   Alternatively, however, a strong 
monetary policy in a contrary direction may also lead a wealthy economy to a big crash.  We 
offered experiences in Taiwan that have taken off using a sufficiently tightening monetary supply 
in the late 1940s and the early 1950s.  We also provided experiences in Argentina that had big 
crashes in the post WWII era, especially after 1970, because of too loose monetary policies.     
Our model also sheds light on the local relationship between money/inflation and capital in 
the long run.  Although very general CIA constraints on investment relative to consumption are 
considered, the local relationship between money/inflation and capital in the long run is not 
determined by the relative CIA constraint and thus different from the findings offered by Lucas 
(1980), Stockman (1981), Wang and Yip (1991), Gong and Zou (2001) and Chang and Tsai 
(2003).  Given a CIA constraint on investment relative to consumption, the local relationship 
between money/inflation and capital is determined by the curvature of utility between wealth and 
consumption. 
Finally, our model has some limitations.  We only consider money as an instrument for a 
big push or a big crash.  As we mention earlier, experiences of big pushes or big crashes are 
combined with monetary policies and other outward- versus inward-looking trade policies.    Also 
important are the attitudes toward foreign direct investment.  These differences in experiences 
may provide different mechanisms in explaining multiple growth regimes and instruments for big 
pushes or big crashes.  Extensions of our model to formally take into account of trade policies 
and the policies of foreign direct investment are possible directions in further research.   
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Appendix: The local stability property of the model is proved as follows.   
The equilibrium dynamic system, (6b), (7b), and (7d), involves one variable whose initial 
value is predetermined and two control variables which may adjust instantaneously.  A steady 
state is a saddle and thus, the dynamic equilibrium path toward the steady state is unique, if the 
characteristic function associated the equilibrium dynamic system has only one negative 
eigenvalue; the dynamic equilibrium path diverges from the steady state if there is no negative 
eigenvalue.  
If we take Taylor’s expansion of the dynamic system (6b), (7b), and (7d) in the 
neighborhood of a steady state, we obtain 
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Differentiating (8a) with respect to c and k obtains 
0 () 0 , dc
dk k fk δ
= ′ = −>                               ( A 3 )  
which is also positively slopping.   
First, for the steady states E1 and E3 in Figure 1, the slope of the  0 c =   locus is lager than 
the slope of the  0 k =   locus.  This indicates the following condition:  Ξ<[f’(k
*)−δ]Γ.  Using 
the relationship in (8a), this condition is exactly the same as Φ>0.  Therefore, Det J<0 for the 
steady states E1 and E3 in Figure 1 and thus the steady states E1 and E3 are saddle.     
Second, for the steady states E2 in Figure 1, the slope of the  0 c =    locus is smaller than the 
slope of the  0 k =   locus.  This indicates the condition of Ξ>[f’(k
*)−δ]Γ which implies Φ<0.  
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Table 1.    Quantify comparative-static effects 
  k1  k3 local  effects  on  k   
benchmark 0.1027196  3.7098848   
μ=6 0.07195717  3.508599 decrease 
μ=4 0.1666077  3.9417109  increase 
μ=1 disappear  5.234797 big  push 
μ=10  0.02856185 disappear  big  crash 
φI=0.9 0.1431811  4.702492  increase 
ρ=0.039 0.1060875  3.846048  increase 
β=0.69 0.1014955  3.50148  decrease 
γ=0.09 0.10265223  3.70865997 decrease 
  Benchmark  parameters:  ρ=0.04, σ=1.5, θ=1, β=0.7, A=0.3, η=0.4, δ=0.065,  








































































































    Figure  2.  Effects  of  inflation  
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Figure 5.    A trap or a big push   
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